






























WHEN “MORE” IS NOT BETTER. 
 MANAGING COMPLEMENTORS  
IN PLATFORM-MEDIATED MARKETS:  
INTRA-PLATFORM COMPETITION, EXCLUSIVITY  
AND SYSTEM DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGIES  
IN THE VIDEOGAME INDUSTRY 
IE Business School Working Paper       DE8-129-I               17-07-2009 
                      Carmelo Cennamo                                               Juan Santaló 
 
                     IE Business School                                          IE Business School 
            Phd Candidate, Dept.of Strategy                                Dept.of Strategy 







This article examines the value-creation capacity of intra-platform competition 
(IPC)  and exclus ivity;  two m ain  strategies  platforms  use to in centivize, 
accumulate  and extract ren t  from  complementary  content resou rces  – 
complementors. Building on the concept of ‘res ource functionality’ we show 
that,  for enhanced levels of IP C,  exclusive  complementors  have lim ited 
functional  value and rareness, failing to   bring  differentiation  capacity  to the  
platform’s system. Also, in line with th e logic of ‘capability equivalence’, we 
show  that platform ’s  differentiation  in term s  of the com position  of 
complementors’  portfolio has a U-shaped relationship with platform  
performance. We test these effects in the U.S. home videogame industry. 
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A larger number of relevant industries in  today’s economy, including  pc operating 
systems,  digital PDA, videogam es  or cr edit-card  systems  are organized around 
platforms  that function as interface between   different groups of users, allowing for  
value-creation  exchanges  to tak e  place  (Evans,  2003; Roson, 2005). The recent  
literature on network economics (e.g., Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Hagiu, 2005; Rochet & 
Tirole, 2003, 2006) refers to these industries as  multi-sided markets since, different  
sides  of the m arket  – like consum ers  and producers of  complementors  (i.e., 
complementary  content goods), advertiser s  and sim ilar  – are linked through. A 
platform,  therefore, creates ‘value networ k’  (Fjeldstad  & Haanaes, 20 01;  Stabell  & 
Fjeldstad,  1998) by selling m ediation  service  to  users on the different sides of the 
market.  
This article examines the performance effects of two main strategies that platforms can 
use to incentivize, accumulate and extract  rent from complementors – intra-platform 
competition (IPC), aimed at maximizing the number of complementors, and exclusivity, 
aimed at securing in ex clusivity complementors with differentiation capacity. W e also 
analyze  whether  a d ifferentiated  system  based  on a structurally  diverse  supply  of 
complementors – what we call system differentiation strategy – can benefit the platform 
beyond the effects of indirect-network exte rnalities. Because of the peculiar dynam ics 
of multi-sided markets, platforms with a wider portfolio of complementors are expected 
to succeed (e.g., Arm strong, 2006; Clements & Ohashi, 2005;  Schilling, 1998, 2002). 
Moreover, the platform able to sec ure complementors in exclusivity can gain f urther 
advantage over competing platform’s systems by denying rivals’ acce ss to scarce a nd 
valuable resources (Armstrong & Wright, 2007). Yet, a large number of complementors 
may  also impose negative externalities on  producers  in the for m  of intensified 




(Boudreau,  2008; Venkatram an  & Lee, 2004). He reafter,  we argue this m ight  be 
particularly  severe for com plementors  operating  in exclusivity  for  a single pla tform 
since they cannot allev iate the enhanced market competition by selling through other 
interfaces.  
Resource-based theory (RBT) emphasizes heterogeneity of resources and their firm -
idiosyncratic value as primary source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993; Wernerlfet, 1984). Since complementors are critical and heterogeneous resources 
for the platform, which also vary in their degr ee of platform specificity in that they can 
be exclusive to the platform or not, we integrate the insights from multi-sided literature 
with RBT and extend this framework to the analysis of platforms’ differences in the 
value of complementors’ portfolio and overa ll system configuration. We build on the  
concept of ‘resource functionality’ advanced  by Peteraf and Bergen  (2003) and argue 
that exclusive complementors may have ex-post limited functional rareness and value 
for a platform with an e xisting large portfolio of complementors. IPC and exclusivity 
strategies are based on differe nt capabilities – we sugge st – and pres ent conflicting 
incentives for complementors. Intense intra-platform competition reduces the incentives 
of  producers to invest in  innovative  high-quality produc ts  when exclusivity is 
demanded,  with the re sult  of  integrating  exclusive  complementors  of lower quality. 
Although exclusive, such complementors would lack the value and rareness necessary 
to differentiate the platform ’s system. Because of the underly ing conflicting resource 
accumulation  (and ince ntive)  processes,  multi-sided  platforms  are called to choo se 
between two valid value-creation strategic approaches: Maximizing the system’s size by 
accumulating  the largest  number  of complementors  that  surpass  a minimum  quality 
standard  or  maximizing  the ove rall  quality  of  the syste m  by tying in top   quality 




– and find empirical support for – a negative effect of the IPC-exclusivity interaction on 
the system’s overall quality and platform’s performance.  
In line with the logic of ‘ capability equivalence’ in Peteraf and Bergen (2003), we also 
find  that sy stem  differentiation  strategy has a U-shaped  relationship  with platform 
performance.  Slight le vels  of  differentiation  in term s  of the com position  of 
complementors’ portfolio may position the platform ambiguously in the competitive 
arena and fail to prov ide distinctive character and value to the system ; whereas large 
degrees of differentiation benefit the plat form. Peteraf and Bergen (2003:1032) hold 
indeed that rival firm s with comparable resource bundles “i n terms of their ability to 
satisfy  similar  customer  needs” have e qual  or functionally sim ilar  capability; 
accordingly, the differentiation capacity, hence rareness and value, they can derive from 
their resources is limited. This is also consistent with the econom ics and management 
literature on differentiation, which shows that only for large degrees of dissimilarity of a 
firm’s offer, competitive pressure is reduced and performance boosted (e.g., Hotelling, 
1929; D’Aspremont et al., 1989; D egryse, 1996; Kim et al, 2004; Porter, 1980, 1985; 
Tirole, 1988).   
This  paper adds to the recen t  literature  of m ulti-sided  platform  markets  (e.g., 
Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong & Wrigth, 2007; Boudreau, 2008; Clements & Ohashi, 
2005;  Corts & Lederman, 2009; Hagiu, 2008) by  being  the first st udy,  to our best 
knowledge, that inspects the in terrelation between different  management strategies of 
complementors  and provides  a theoretical  rationale  for and em pirical  evidence  of a 
tradeoff between acclaimed value-enhancing strategies – IPC and exclusivity. Our study 
can also contribute to the literature on RBT. By examining the value of complementors 
in terms of their functionality in different platform’s systems we advance an explanation 




least in our research context. We show that the characteristic and type of a resource (i.e., 
exclusivity) are not sufficient for value-creation. It is ultimately its use in the integrated 
system  that m akes  a difference in term s  of  the value of the product for the final 
customers. This, together w ith the finding that platform s can benefit from a system 
differentiation  strategy, pr ovide  a first explanation  for  why, despite netw ork 
externalities,  multiple  incompatible  systems  can coexist –   which is a lso  the area  in 
technology adoption and network externalities literature less studied (Shankar & Bayus, 
2003). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follo ws. In the next section we briefly summarize 
recent studies on complementors’ value for platform’s success in multi-sided markets. 
Building on these findings and RBT, we then present our theory on the strategic tradeoff 
between  IPC  and exclusivity strategies,  and  the perform ance  effects of system 
differentiation strategy. Next, we describe our  empirical approach and analysis of the 
U.S. home videogame industry (1995-2008). Th e paper concludes with discussion of 
the findings and implications for practice and future research. 
  THE VALUE OF COMPLEMENTORS IN MULTI-SIDED MARKETS 
Network economics theory on multi-sided markets (e.g., Armstrong, 2006; Hagiu, 2005; 
Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 2006) predicts that gr owth in customers’ installed base and 
complementary product availability are main mechanisms driving platform’s adoption 
as well as product value (Brynjolfsson a nd Kemerer, 1996; Clements & Ohashi, 2005; 
Dew & Read, 2006). This is due to the indi rect network-effects characterizing multi-
sided markets: the value a custom er realizes from the platform on one s ide increases 
with the number and variety of complem entors on the other side (Evans, 2003). At the  
same  time,  the  profits  an individ ual  firm  can attain by pr oviding  complementary 




platform or expected to in the near future . So, the participation of at least one group 
(e.g., producers of complementors) raises the value of participating for the other group 
(e.g., final users) and can help surm ounting the classical ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem 
characterizing  these m arkets  (Caillaud  &  Jullien, 2003; Roson, 2005). Platfor m 
providers are called to devise effective strategies to manage these cross-market network 
effects, and attract and  integrate valuable complementors into the p latform’s system 
(Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Yoffie & Kwak, 2006).  
In markets characterized by  “winner-takes-all” or “takes-most” dynam ics, companies 
with a larger network’s size and a larger num ber of complementors are expected to win 
the competitive battle and become the de facto standard in the  industry (e.g., Arthur, 
1989, 1996; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). As Katz  and Shapiro suggest, “systems that are 
expected to be popular – and  thus have widely available components – will be m ore 
popular  for that very reason” (1994:94). Th is  explains why we frequently observe 
intense races between competing platforms to quickly accumulate complementors and 
customers  (e.g., Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Suar ez,  2004). In this sense, Schilling 
(2002) finds that technologica l standard-based products w ith large installed bases are 
likely to attract more developers of complementary goods, which, in turn, influences the 
size  of the installed base. Shilling c oncludes  that a “technology for which the 
availability of complementary goods is poorer  than that of com peting technologies is, 
other things being equal, less likely to be adopted by customers” (Schilling, 2002: 389). 
Results of Clements and Ohashi’s (2005) anal ysis of the U.S. videogam e industry also 
show  the importance of wide availabi lity  of  complementary  goods along with 
penetration pricing to increase platform’s adoption rate. Corts and Lederman (2009) add 




between the two sides of the individual system but also across competing systems when 
a major part of high-quality complementors is not exclusive.    
Nonetheless,  managing  complementors,  evaluating  their potential  ex-post  value  and 
effectively integrating them into the existing portfolio are critical and complex strategic 
tasks for the platform (Yoffie & Kwak, 2006), which go beyond maximizing the size of 
the portfolio (e.g., Boudreau, 2008; Suarez, 2005). This becomes evident if one looks at 
complementors not just as final products but  as critical resources the platform must 
effectively accumulate and structure in order to build a coherent and successful system. 
Complementors as Platform’s Resources 
The  economics  and m anagement  literature  on standard   battles co nverge  on the 
importance of considering the whole system (platform-complementors) when analyzing 
competition  between standards and   the factors   affecting its dyna mics  (e.g., Katz & 
Shapiro, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Suarez, 2004; Wade, 1995). Taking the system 
as unit of analysis, complementors can be naturally conceived of as valuable resources 
of the system. Some of these resources are internally developed by the platform itself 
(e.g., Nintendo’s Super Mario in the videogame sector; Microsoft’s  Office in the pc 
operating system and similar); yet, the bulk of complementors is generally produced by 
third-party firms. The challenge a platform faces in building a valuab le system is to 
stimulate (provide incentives for) the production of such re sources, evaluate and select 
the most valuable for the system and effectively integrate them into the system.  
Resource-Based Theory (RBT) conceptualizes the firm as a collection of resources tied 
‘semi-permanently’  to the firm (Barney,  1991;  Peteraf, 1993;  Wernerlfelt,  1984). 
Relevant resources that are specific to the firm and not capable of easy im itation by 
rivals  are s ources  of  Ricardian r ents  that  constitute  firm’s  competitive  advantage 




accumulation process) that contributes to firms’ heterogeneity: firms are endowed with 
different resources and capabilities, and these differences are reflected in performance 
and  competitive  advantage dif ferentials.  According  to Barney (19 91),  sustainable 
competitive  advantage derives f rom  firm-specific  resources  that  are  valuable, r are, 
inimitable and non-substitutable.  
Lavie  (2007) points out that, for firm s  embedded in networks, a richer portfolio of 
resources can provide the firm  with greater value-creation opportunities. This ought to 
be  particularly true in platform -mediated  markets  wherein a larger num ber  of 
complementors  increases value-exchanging  opportunities  for users of the platform. 
Also, as first advanced by Dierickx and Cool (1989), the value of a resource may highly 
depend on the existing stock of assets (i.e ., resource bundles) a firm possesses. Asset 
interconnectedness  plays m ajor  role  also in platform   markets.  First, an individual  
complementor  may  be of intrinsically hi gh  value, and yet offer no value-enhancing 
capacity to the platform if it stands alone. The platform has to put together a balanced 
portfolio  of  complementors  in order to bu ild  an appealing sys tem  and extrac t  the 
potential value from its complementors. Indeed, Penrose suggests that “[no] resources 
… are of much use by themselves; any efficient use for them is always viewed in terms 
of  possible com binations  with other res ources”  (1959:86). Second, developers of 
complementors generally have  little incentives to produce and tie th eir products to a 
platform with a low custom ers’ installed-base (e.g., Venkatraman & Lee, 2004; W ade, 
1995). Since platform’s adoption by custom ers is function of the availability of wide 
complementors,  the platform with an ex isting  number  of com plementors  provides 
higher incentives to developers for produci ng and licensing their  products to it (e.g., 
Schilling,  2002; W ade,  1995). Therefore,  the  existing stock of com plementors 




would need, and, at the same time, also affects its type and characteristics, along with its 
value. Since complementors represent unique resource bundles when tied to the specific 
platform,  which are difficult to rep licate  in  the  short term   also becau se  of indirect 
network  effects, path-dependency and asse t  interconnectedness,  they  are poten tial 
source of platform’s competitive advantage (e.g., Shankar & Bayus, 2003).     
THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
In our research context – the videogam e industry – platforms usually employ two main 
strategies to attract, accumulate and integrate complementor resources: intra-platform 
competition (IPC)  and  exclusive  licensing  (exclusivity).  By promoting internal  
competition the platform aims at stimulating the production of a greater number of 
complementors and of higher inno vative content.  Because of enhanced com petition, 
complementors’ providers have powerful incen tives to innovate and  differentiate their 
products (Boudreau, 2008). Armstrong (2006) suggests that a platform can m aximize 
profits by allowing for increasing levels of co mpetition on the retail side since this can 
stimulate the production of a la rger variety of complementors and, by force of indirect 
network effects, drive to increased users’ adoption.  
Exclusivity, on the other side, is aimed at securing rare resources the platform can use to 
enhance complementors’ quality-based differentiation capacity vis-à-vis rival platforms, 
and limit rivals’ value-creation opportunities by denying them access to these resources. 
Armstrong and Wright (2007), for instance, show that under certain conditions (mostly 
important, consumers’ pure preferences am ong platforms, which induce them  to join 
only one of the competing systems) the emerging dominant platform can successfully 
corner the market (the classical ‘winner-take-all’ scenario) if able to secure a large part 




In addition to these strategies, a platform  may choose to configure the system  in a 
structurally different manner from its competitors so to focus on and meet new specific 
customers’  needs. W e  call th is  approach  system differentiation strategy.  Here, 
platform’s capability resides in discovering new profitable market niches and develop a 
tailored  made  system  that prov ides  customers  of the niche with hig her  value  than 
competing systems. For instance, in  the pc operating system, Apple has developed a  
superior knowledge and capability in delivering a hardware-software system that better 
satisfies customers with needs and preferen ces for editing m edia files (music, video, 
photos…). Similarly, Sega successfully challenged the dominance of Nintendo in the 16 
bit videogame console market by developing hit software titles based on popular sports 
like basketball or football that were absent  in Nintendo’s supply of ga me titles. Since 
the  battle f or  dominance  may  be severe a nd  lead to rent dissipation in networked 
markets (e.g., Sheremata, 2004; Suarez, 2004) , a system differentiation strategy m ay 
limit  this risk and prove beneficial for  performance  (provided a platform has the 
necessary capability of iden tifying profitable market nich es and effectively deploying 
complementors to serve these niches). In what follows, we develop specific hypotheses 
on  the pote ntial  value-creation  and  performance  effects of these sy stem-structuring 
strategies.  
Competition versus exclusivity 
RBT suggests that firms with valuable res ources will attain competitive advantage if 
rivals are denied access to resources of the  same type. In this sense, since console’s 
exclusive game titles are complementors of a scarce and non-imitable type, the platform 
that  secures  them  is ex pected  to g ain  advantage.  And because of indirect network 
effects,  this advantage should be greater  for  the platform with larger num ber  of 




a complementary value-adding effect. However, as RBV theorists have come to clarify 
more recently, “it is not the resou rce type per se that matters, it is the f unctionality of 
the resource and how the resource is employed” (Lockett, Thompson and Morgenstern, 
2009:13). Peteraf and Bergen have indeed proposed such a shift in perspective and 
contend that “resource scarcity should be assessed in terms of resource functionality 
rather than resource type…[since] the value of a resource derives from its application in 
product markets” (2003:1028). Following these lines, resources that are ex-ante of a rare 
type (e.g., exclusive complementors) may ex-post prove of limited value if they increase 
only marginally the value-creation capacity of the existing assets. Resources of the same 
type  may  indeed assu me  different value in   different firm s  according to their 
idiosyncratic bundling, which in turn is functi on of firm’s specific resource-capabilities 
combinations (e.g., Newbert, 2008; Sirmon et al., 2007).  
We argue that exclusive com plementors have ex-post limited functional value for the 
system  with enhanced intra-p latform  competition  since (a)   they ar e,  on  average, of  
inferior quality because of the lim ited incentives implied by high lev els of IPC that 
cannot be alleviated with sale s in competing platforms, and (b), because of that, they 
can bring very lim ited differentiation capacity, if any, to the platform ’s system. Our 
main  contention is that platform s  need  to  choose betw een  two alternative viable  
approaches to manage complementors in multi-sided markets: Either concentrate their 
strategic  efforts on m aximizing  the num ber  of com plementors  that qualify for a 
minimum  quality standard and therefore promote  de facto  intense levels of   intra-
platform competition; or focus on maximizing the overall quality of complementors’ 
offer and compete with platform s offering a larger number of complementors by tying 
in top quality complementors that in return of accepting an exclusivity agreement will 




to  update continuously their  complementors  management  strategies; yet,  platfor m 
providers that do not take a clear position between these two alternative approaches may 
fail to build a coherent system and face seriou s competitive disadvantages from the 
consequent inability to structure an appeal ing bundle of resources. On one hand, these 
firms  will f ail  to attrac t  sufficient  volume  and  variety  of  complementors  since  the 
exclusivity  requirement  will de ter  some  of  them  from  joining the platf orm. 
Additionally, they will fail to achieve the level of complementors quality necessary to 
obviate  the need for a larg e  number  (and  variety)  of com plementors  because  of 
relatively high levels of IPC. Though all platforms will show some degree of exclusivity 
in their complementors, IPC- and exclusivity-based strategies imply different resource 
accumulation processes, and are for this reason at tradeoff. In the video game industry, 
as in other markets of similar dynamics (e.g., pc-operating system, internet browsers), 
sales of complementors are highly skewed  towards popular gam e titles (Clements & 
Ohashi, 2005; Corts & Lederm an, 2009). Although a wider variety of com plementors 
increases  platform’s  value by app ealing  to custom ers’  heterogeneous  preferences, 
platform’s adoption is usually driven by sales of ‘hit’ complem entors. Therefore the 
functional  value  of  a g ame,  being it ex clusive  or not,   is ultim ately  function  of  its 
capacity to appeal on a large base of customers. Our central contention is that exclusive 
titles lack this capacity and are, on average, of inferior value for systems with enhanced 
levels of IPC.  
Platforms might inevitably need to trade the benefits of the IPC strategy for the capacity 
of attracting high-value exclusive complementors. Enhanced competition might indeed 
lower the incentives of high-quality producers to develop and lunch new games for the 
crowded  console (Boudreau, 2008; Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). Although IPC c an 




individual complementors, shrinks the size of  the potential market for each platform’s 
application and reduces revenue-margins. Boudreau (2008), for instance, shows that in 
the market for PDA’s applications, as the number of a platform’s complementors grows 
large, the intensity of price competition across complementors in the sam e category 
increases  and reduces incentiv es  for i nnovation.  Developers m ight  not reach   the 
efficient  scale  and/or  returns  required  for  up-front large investm ents  in high-quality 
titles. Also, Venkatraman and Lee (2004) find that developers are more likely to choose 
newer platforms to launch their innovative products as these offer, despite their smaller 
initial  network,  better  market  opportunities com pared  to crowded platform s.  These 
disincentives  are m ore  severe for exclus ive  complementors  that cannot relieve the 
effects of intensified competition with sales on other platf orms. In summary, IPC and 
exclusivity  strategies imply different stru cturing  and bundling approaches that have 
limited  complementary  value. IPC of fers  limited  incentives  for  complementors  of 
superior  quality when con tingent  upon exclusivity: Under  increasing  levels of IPC, 
exclusive complementors with lower functional value are more likely of being attracted. 
The quality of the overall system may accordingly be negatively affected. 
(Hypothesis 1a): The number of high-value exclusive complementors will be negatively 
related to the joint implementation of intra-platform competition and exclusivity 
strategies. 
(Hypothesis 1b): The overall quality of a platform’s system will be negatively related to 
the joint implementation of intra-platform competition and exclusivity strategies.    
 
Peteraf and Bergen (2003) maintain that the value of a resource is ultimately defined by 
what the firm can derive from its application in product markets. We have argued above 




exclusive titles of inferior value. The joint implementation of IPC and exclusivity might 
accordingly prove detrimental to platform’s performance, also because of its negative 
effect  on the overall quality of the syst em.  Notwithstanding the key influence of 
network externalities, quality is still important to consumers even in networked-markets 
(Liebowitz & Margolis, 1999;  Schilling, 2003; Zhu & Iansi ti, 2007). Zhu & Iansiti’s 
(2007) model advances that a lthough indirect network eff ects’ mechanism determines 
the market outcome, the platform’s relative quality on both sides of the market is likely 
to affect long-run m arket shares. If, in f act, consumers value also the quality of the 
system when making their platform’s adoption decision, present the lim ited functional 
value and rareness, and the negative effect on system quality, we should expect enlarged 
IPC and exclusivity to affect negatively platform performance. In their recent models on 
the role of platform’s access to exclusive content, both Lee (2007) and Mantena  et al. 
(2007) suggest that dom inant platforms, in fact, might derive limited differentiation 
benefits from exclusive content goods. A ccordingly, we hypothesize a negative ef fect 
on performance when exclusivity is contingent upon high levels of IPC. 
(Hypothesis 1c): Platform performance will be negatively related to the joint 
implementation of intra-platform competition and exclusivity strategies.  
System Differentiation 
Firms can show differences on performance not because they possess different types of 
resources, but because they integrate and combine them in different ways (Sirmon et al., 
2007). Moreover, resources’ value-creation potential may be contingent on the value of 
resource-competencies (Newbert, 2008). To  the extent that functional heterogeneous 
resources  across firm s  serve d ifferent  customers’  needs (i.e., find different m arket 
applications), firms gain differentiation capacity in the product market space (Peteraf & 




unique and specialized in their m arket segment. We advance here that a platform  that 
configures the supply of complementors in a structurally different manner from rivals – 
what we have referred to as sy stem differentiation strategy – can gain differentiation 
capacity.  
Although  a given co mplementor  may  be  present  on multiple sy stems,  it m ight 
nonetheless serve a different use in  those systems: for example, a family-genre game 
might ‘simply’ adds variety for the larger platform , whereas for a sm aller platform 
focusing  on that specific niche of the m arket  it m ay  represent  the leading/d riving 
application, and assume greater strategic use. T he value of such application for each 
system is accordingly different. A platform with a differentiated system may face lower 
degrees of competition since its complementor bundles find different application in the 
market by serving a different base of custom ers. In this sense, a system differentiation 
strategy  can increase the v alue  and rare ness  of the platform ’s  portfolio of 
complementors and contribute to systems’ heterogeneity.  
However, differentiating platforms run the risk of having their niche markets covered by 
the  offer  of ‘genera list’  platforms.  Similar  configurations can blur the differences  
between the differentiated system and rivals’. For small levels of system differentiation, 
using the words of Peteraf and Bergen (2003:1 032), rival platforms have “capability 
equivalence”,  that is, com plementor  bundles  that are comparable to those of the 
differentiating platform “in terms of their ability to satisfy similar customer needs”. In 
such  cases, the system   might  fail to gain di fferentiation  value.  This is in lin e  with 
models  of spatial com petition  (e.g., D’ Aspremont  et al., 1979; Econom ides,  1986; 
Hotelling,  1929; Salop, 1979) where differen tiation is conceived in   terms  of spatial  
distance between competing firms. Firms located in proximity to each other share to a 




higher levels of differentiation would accordingly reduce competition for both resources 
and customers by increasing the underlying di stance. Differentiated firms enjoy less 
fierce competition for local customers, as their offerings are based on distinct functions 
in which they hold a competitive advantage (Chung & Kalnins, 2001; Kalnins, 20 03). 
However, since differentiation is risky and  its costs – missing the demand of the mass 
market (Economides, 1986; Tirole, 1988); large  cost gap with low-cost offer (Porter, 
1985);  evolution of buyers’ needs and com petitors’  imitation  (Porter, 1985) – can 
dwindle its benefits, these m odels predict that benefits can be attained only when the 
differentiation distance is m aximized; namely, when firms successfully locate at the 
extremes of the competitive space. 
These  logics suggest that only w hen  the  degree  of dissim ilarity  in com plementor 
bundles  grows large the system   can gain di fferentiation  capacity and better satisfy 
consumer needs within the targeted market segment. The differentiated platform offers 
greater value to the niche’s consumers in that it provides greater complementors’ variety 
and specificity for that niche  compared to rival ‘generalis t’ systems. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize  that a sy stem  differentiation  strategy  can  affect positiv ely  platform 
performance to the extent th at rival systems do not have capability  equivalence; this 
happens for large levels of syste m differentiation. Slight levels of  differentiation will 
rather be detrimental since platforms will miss the demand from the mass-market and, 
yet, fail to provide enough di stinctive character that crea tes value for niche m arket’s 
consumers.   
(Hypothesis 2) System differentiation strategy will have a U-shaped relationship with 
platform performance: low levels of complementor bundles dissimilarity decrease 
platform performance; high levels of complementor bundles dissimilarity increase 




THE VIDEOGAME INDUSTRY 
 
We empirically test our hypotheses in the framework of the U.S. videogam e industry. 
This is a young and dynamic sector that, starting in the early 1970s has grown to reach 
$18.8 billion in revenues in  2007, with about 65% of Am erican households playing 
computer  or videogames.
1  Standing  the  complementarity  of  the ha rdware-software 
products, the console’s value to the user adopting a specific platform increases with the 
number of videogames available for that console. By the same token, producers of these 
complementary products have incentive to develop games for consoles with an existing 
large installed base or a hi gh potential network of users  (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). 
The  building and size of such network is  therefore  the classical “chicken-and -egg” 
problem  (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003) created by   indirect network externalities, which 
characterize multi-sided markets (Rochet & Tirole, 2006; Roson, 2005). Three recent  
studies (Clements & Ohashi, 2005; Corts  & Lederman, 2009; Shankar & Bayus, 2003)  
have  indeed shown the im portance  of indi rect  network effects in the videogam e 
industry.  
Data 
Our dataset consists of  monthly observations on console and gam e-title sales, which 
comes  from the NPD Group, a U S-based  leading  market  research firm .  We  have 
compiled information of a total of 15 hom e-video consoles for the period from January 
1995 to June 2008, 5 of which introduced  prior to 1995; and 5,865 unique videogame  
titles, for a total of 944 platform-month observations
2.We know the introduction date of 
each game title and console, the qu antity sold in units and dollars term s, the average 
                                                 
1 This figure comprises sales of both console videogame hardware and software, along with PC 
videogame software. In details, $5.12B from console videogame hardware, $8.64B from console 
videogame software, $0.91B from PC videogame software and the rest from accessories. NPD Group; 
and Entertainment Software Association 2008 Sales, Demographic and Usage Data.   
2 We truncate a platform-time series at the month where the platform has no longer active sales 




selling  price and other descriptive inform ation  such as g ame  genre. These data are 
compiled by the NPD Group through the surv eying of approximately 65% of game  
retailers
3  in the United States ;  from  this data ,  NPD Group subsequently for mulates 
estimates of figures for the entire U.S. m arket. Sales to rental outlets (e.g. Blockbuster)  
are  excluded from   these estim ates.  Clements  and Ohashi (2005), Lee (2007), 
Venkatraman and Lee (2004) also use NPD da ta for their analysis. We integrate this  
rich dataset with additional information on consoles’ and titles’ characteristics, which 
we draw from console manufacturers’ and other specialized websites.  
Measures 
Dependent Variables: 
 Platform Market Share is defined as console’s unit sales in a given month over 
total  unit s ales  of  active  consoles  that  month.  This variab le  better gauges the  
performance progress of the console relative  to other active platform s, capturing the 
monthly competitive dynamics of the indus try and the ov erlap of incumbent and new 
generation consoles. Clements and Ohashi (2005) also use this variable to accoun t for 
competition overtime in their estimation of the cross-sides network effects.  
  High-Value Exclusive Titles.  We follow Peteraf and Bergen’s (2003) 
suggestion that resource’s value should be as sessed in terms of its market application. 
With  this in m ind,  we construct this variab le  that captures the functional value of 
exclusive titles by m easuring the extent of  their market popularity. We gauge this by 
following Corts and Lederman’s (2009) identification procedure of “hits” titles, except 
that we are interested in exclusive titles. We consider only those platforms for which we 
                                                 
3 These are the 12 largest videogame retailers in the US market. More details on the data 
collection methodology of the NPD Group are provided in its webpage, in the entertainment market 
research section (http://www.npd.com/corpServlet?nextpage=entertainment-




can track the entire history of titles’ release (i.e., those launched after January 1995). 
We compute, for every platform of generation five, six and seven, the total dollar-sales 
each exclusive title generates over its entire life-period on that platform and divide this 
figure by the total p latform’s installed base at the end of the generation period
4. This 
gives us an estimate of the platform per-user dollars spent on that title. We then take the 
distribution of this variable over all exclusive titles of generation five, six and seven and 
identify the 75
th percentile of this distribution. We use this cut-off point to construct our 
generation relative measure of the value of each  exclusive complementor, as expressed 
by its popularity. W e accordingly assign a dummy equal to 1 to each  exclusive title 
falling above this threshold and count, each  month for each platform , the number of 
such titles.  
System Quality. We use the score assigned to each title by  IGN.com, a website 
specialized in reviews of videogam e’s software and hardware, and take the average  
score of platform’s active titles each  month as measure of system quality. IGN.com 
assigns  each gam e  a value on the scale from   1 to 10 on the basis of consumers’ 
feedback  and experts ’  reviews. Unf ortunately,  information  on title s’  rating is not 
available for generations 3 and 4 and for th e platforms Jaguar, 3DO, and Saturn of 
generation 5. This restricts our sam ple to 578 platform-month observations. Also, we  
were  not ab le  to p erfectly  match  all  of  the  titles pr esent  on our data base  with the 
IGN.com scores: out of the 6047 titles of the plat forms within the restricted sample, we 
have  information  on 5016 titles, about 83 %,  with this figure ranging from 70% 
(Playstation1) to 99% (Playstation3) at the platform level.  
Independent variables:  
                                                 
4 Corts and Lederman (2009) compute this variable for the 12 months after title’s release. Although large 
part of a title’s sales accrue during the first months after its release, titles that prove popular have active 
and large sales for an extended period of the platform generation compared to average titles. Accordingly, 
we deem more appropriate for our purposes considering the whole title’s selling-period rather than just 




Intra-platform competition (IPC).  IPC is the m onthly  number  of platform ’s 
titles over the total monthly number of titles of all platforms active that m onth. An 
alternative measure that could capture the degree of competition across complementors 
for a given platform would be the cumulative number of titles released for that console 
up to each month. Both Cle ments and Ohashi (2005) and Corts and Lederm an (2009) 
use this measure in their estimations of the indirect-network effects. However, such  
variable  does  not take into accou nt  the interdependence a mong  platforms.  A game  
producer may decide to release a n ew title for a platform despite its high num ber of 
existing titles if other platforms are even more crowded. We think a better way to gauge 
IPC  is by using a relative m easure,  given  also  our inte rest  in  the v alue  of 
complementors relative to competitors. However we have replicate all our results with 
this alternative variable of IPC achieving the same qualitative results.  
Exclusivity refers to the extent to which game titles are available only on a given 
platform. We define a title as exclusive if  it has never been released for any other 
platform during our observation period. Sim ilarly to IPC, we m easure exclusivity in 
relative terms, as the number of platform’s exclusive titles over total exclusive titles of 
all active platforms each month.  
System Differentiation. One way a console p rovider could shape differently its 
system is by differentiating their gam es’ offer. This is evident in table 1 where the  
distribution  of titles by genr e  of consoles in the sam e  generation  varies for som e 
























GAMES  STRATEGY  PLATFORM 
CHARACTER  OTHERS 
Generation 4                
SNES  17%  9%  21%  2%  2%  5%  3%  36%  4% 
GENESIS  19%  9%  25%  2%  2%  4%  3%  34%  3% 
                
Generation 5                
JAGUAR 
(ATARI)  29%  21% 16%  0%  8%  7%  3%  17%  0% 
N64  24%  22% 26%  2%  2%  7%  1%  11%  3% 
3DO  33%  20% 12%  9%  1%  14%  3%  4%  4% 
PLAYSTATION  24%  21% 24%  3%  2%  7%  2%  8%  8% 
SATURN  34%  15% 24%  0%  2%  3%  4%  14%  5% 
                
Generation 6                
DREAMCAST  27%  33% 19%  0%  2%  5%  1%  5%  7% 
GAMECUBE  17%  23% 41%  1%  0%  6%  1%  8%  2% 
PLAYSTATION 2  19%  31% 23%  2%  1%  7%  2%  6%  10% 
XBOX  23%  33% 25%  1%  1%  4%  1%  6%  6% 
                
Generation 7                
PLAYSTATION 3  28%  26% 31%  0%  0%  3%  1%  5%  6% 
WII  15%  39% 15%  1%  0%  14%  2%  9%  5% 
XBOX 360  30%  27% 26%  0%  0%  4%  3%  3%  8% 
§ Figures for NES (generation 3) not reported due to missing values on the genre variable. Percentages reported are 
platform means over the observed period of number of titles in each ge nre over total number of titles for the platform 
each month.  
 
 
Wii has been the first console to of fer games as diverse as those on brains-
training,  food-recipes, fitne ss-centered,  music  composing  and  the like. Also, in the 
action segment, because of its  revolutionary controller, it has spawn the production of 
various new games that differ from those offered on competing platforms, focused more 
on the action-fight segment. One way to gau ge such a differentiated com position of 
system’s complementors is by considering the percentage of titles offered by a platform 




generation  mean.  Accordingly, we define  platform  differentiation for each m onth-
platform as:  
 
where g represents the different titles’ genres, tg is the percentage of platform titles in 
genre g and tg upper-bar is its generation-industry mean. We take the sum across genres 
of the absolute value o f these differences  and  use this index as m easure  of syst em 
differentiation. This variable m easures then the distance between the focal platform ’s 
system composition and the generation mean (i.e., competitors system composition), 
and  assumes  value of   zero when the dis tribution  of  platform  titles a cross  genres 
coincides with its competitors average, and increases the larger the deviation from the 
generation’s mean. This value would be at  its maximum for the extreme case wherein 
the platform’s offer does not overlap at all with peers’. In our sample, a maximum value 
of 1.12 is reached by the Nintendo’s N64 console in October 1996. 
Control variables:  
Platform price  can be an im portant  driver of   platform  penetration capacity, 
especially  in  multi-sided  markets  (e.g., Ha giu,  2005; Rochet & Tiro le,  2003). It is 
defined here as the av erage price of each  console in each month and computed by 
dividing  the console’s dollar sales by its  unit  sales.  We  then  use  the log- linear 
transformation of such variable in the analysis. Platform age is the difference between a 
given month date and the console’s launch da te, adjusted so that the  first month of 
console’s sales, platform age takes value 1 rather than 0. Controlling for platform age is 
particularly important in our  setting. It can capture consum ers’ expectations about the 
number of new games that can be released for that console and/or the launch time of the 
next generation of consoles; and thus aff ect console’s adoption decision. Also, while 
tg  t  g
g1
9




platform age might be negatively related to platform  market share due to the s mall 
amassed network of users in the early life-c ycle, as time passes and the platform keeps 
selling, its installed bas e would be growi ng larger and th is will further activate the 
positive indirect network effects. Henceforth, we can expect an “older” platform to have 
an advantage over new consoles – the network  inertia effect. Because of this potential 
curvilinear effect, we also con trol for the squared value of  platform age. Generation 
Competition, defined here as the number of rival  consoles in the sam e technological 
generation active each month,  is another important factor that m ay affect platform’s 
capacity  to  attract us ers.  One would exp ect  that as this num ber  grows larger, 
competition  among  platforms  gets m ore  intense  and af fect  negatively  performance. 
Corts and Lederman (2009) show, though, the possibility of positive externalities across 
platforms at the generation level when the m ajority of complementors is not exclusive. 
Finally, time (in quarters) and platform fixed-effects are also used to further control for 
unobserved  factors. P latform  fixed-effects  capture unobserved he terogeneity  across 
platforms  that are constant overtime, such as m ight  be di fferences  in technological 
features  (for  instance,  compatibility),  perceived  quality b y  consumers  that m ay  be 
attributed to marketing campaigns and the like. These platform-specific characteristics, 
although not observed by the researcher, are like ly to affect the intrinsic value of a  
platform, hence its performance. We also account for unobserved time-effects such as 
seasonal trends by including three dummies for the different quarter periods of the year. 
This  is p articularly  relevant  for  our  setting  as, for instance, sa les  of consoles and 
videogames are usually much higher in the last  quarter of the year. Also, it is generally 
in this period that new consoles are introdu ced in the market. Table 2A and 2B present  
summary statistics and correlation table of the variables used in our empirical analysis. 







Variable  N Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
       
Platform Price  944  4.59  0.81  1.39  6.39 
Exclusivity  944  0.15  0.13  0.00  0.47 
IPC  944  0.16  0.12  0.00  0.44 
Exclusivity x IPC  944  0.04  0.05  0.00  0.21 
Differentiation  895  0.14  0.13  0.00  1.12 
Differentiation squared  895  0.04  0.08  0.00  1.26 
System Quality  578  7.01  0.44  5.50  9.00 
High-Value Exclusive Titles  648  57  36  2.00  120 
Platform Market Share  944  0.17  0.19  0.00  0.71 
Platform Age  944  55  37  1.00  154 
Platform Age squared  944  4441  4999  1.00  23716 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Exclusivity-IPC Trade-off: Informal Evidence 
Platform Market Share    System Average Quality 
   IPC      IPC 
  
LOW  HIGH 
    
LOW  HIGH 
       
               
LOW  0.156  0.189    LOW  7.19  7.31 
             
EXCLUSIVITY       EXCLUSIVITY    
             
HIGH  0.193  0.145    HIGH  7.01  6.61 
           
LOW and HIGH of each dimension is defined as greater than (HIGH) the median value or lower/equal than 
(LOW) the median. The table reports for each cell of the belonging sub-sample the median of platform’s 
market share (left-side of the table) and average of titles’ quality score (on the right-side).  
 
Table 3 offers some informal evidence of the tradeoff between exclusiv ity and 
intra-platform competition. We divide the sample between high and low Exclusivity and 
high and low IPC by taking as cutting point  the respective medians. We then compute 
the median of platform market share (left quadrant) and system quality (right quadrant) 
and report in each cell the va lue of the co rresponding sub-sample. As one can no tice, 
platform market share is lower in cases  of both low or high Exclusivity-IPC, and is 
higher when console providers focus their effort either in stimulating a higher variety of 
new titles (high IPC, low Exclusiv ity) or when they try to dif ferentiate their console 
through the provision of exclusive content (high Exclusivity, low IPC). Moreover, the  
quadrant on system quality clearly shows that the average quality of complementors is 
lower for the high-high combination of IPC and Exclusivity.  
More formally that in Table 3, we test these potential effects by estimating the 
following panel data model:  
DVit = Φi +Τt +β0 + β1 Exclusivityit + β2 IPCit + β3 Exclusivityit x IPCit 




where  DVit  is the set of our dependent variables,  Φi  represents the coefficient of 
platform fixed-effects, Τt the set of  dummies for time fixed-effects, and  ξit the error 
term. Even if the presence of platform  fixed effects alleviates concerns about omitted 
variables biases, our equation will not be properly estimated if other endogeneity issues 
are present. Given the characteristics of our sample,  Price, IPC, and the  Exclusivity 
variables may likely be correlated with console’s error ξit. For example, the error term 
will capture variations of unobserved value and/or quality of console i in month t from 
its overall mean. Since platform price generally reflects o ver time these variations in 
unobserved  quality, w hich  will likely be perceiv ed  by consum ers,  price can   be 
correlated  with the   error term .  For sim ilar  reasons, IP C,  Exclusivity, and as a  
consequence  their interaction will be corr elated  with the erro r  causing endogeneity 
biases.  As a result, to properly identify e quation  (1), we need to find instrum ental 
variables  (hereafter,  IV) that are correlated with   our endogenous variables, but 
uncorrelated with the error term. 
We follow Clements and Ohashi’s (2005) id entification procedure to control for the 
endogeneity  in console price and IPC vari ables.  We  use the 1-year lag m onthly 
exchange rates between the U.S. Dollar and Japanese Yen as instrument for price. Since 
the manufacturing process of almost every console present in our sample is undertaken 
in Japan, and given that consol es are usually introduced first in Japan one year before 
the  commercialization  in the States, thes e  exchange rates are a good proxy of the 
production cost of the console a nd therefore should affect the U.S. console retail price. 
At  the same tim e,  these exchange rates should be independent of the unobserved 
variations in quality of other platform -level missing variables that compose the error 
term in our regressions. The m onthly average age of titles active in a given m onth is 




obsolescence) of game titles and can be used as proxy by complementors’ producers to 
guide their game’s introduction decision. At  the same time, a higher average age m ay 
also  indicate  the presence of “blockbuster”  titles,  which,  because of their m arket 
success, have an extended life cycle and contribute to rising the average age of all titles. 
Accordingly, this variable is likely related to producers’ decision of releasing new titles 
for the platform, hence, to IPC. However,  the average age of titles should have no 
effects on variations of unobser ved quality of the platform  across time (i.e., the error 
term): what matters to consumers’ adoption decision is not the age of titles but their 
quality, characteristics and availab ility in variety. Clements and Ohashi (2005) use in 
fact this variable to instrument the offer of game titles in their estimations.  
 We use the num ber of exclusive titles in  the previous generation  of the platform as 
instrument for Exclusivity. Such titles m ay increase the d ifferentiation capacity of the 
previous generation console, hence its market penetration. The updated console (i.e., the 
new generation console of the sa me provider) can benefit from such differentiation in 
the form of higher brand reputation and visibi lity. Platform providers can then leverage 
on  such in tangible,  path-dependent  resources  to succes sfully  introduce  the n ew 
generation  and have higher bargaining power   with com plementors’  providers. We  
expect then exclusivity of previous generation console to affect publishers’ expectations 
and decision about whether to release the titles in exclusivity to the platform. Yet, these 
titles  have no value for buyers of   the ne w  generation console since m ight  not be  
compatible with the co nsole of current gen eration and will, in any case, be no longer 
available on the m arket; henceforth, they should be independent from the unobserved 
variations of platform value  captured by the error term in our regressions. Finally, we 
instrument  the inter action  of  Exclusivity  with  IPC by using the interaction of their 




variables are independent of each other (Baum  et al., 2007)
5. As Clements and Ohashi 
(2005),  we also use the squared term s  of  the  instruments  in our estim ation.  We 
implement these instruments and estimate equation (1) via standard IV estimation.  
RESULTS 
Table 4 presents OLS and IV estimation results for models in which the number 
of High Value Exclusive Titles is the dependent variable.  As expected, platforms with 
enhanced levels of both IPC and exclusivity  will end up with exclusive com plementors 
of limited value as evidenced, in all m odels of table 4, by the strong negative relation 
between High-Value Exclusive Titles and the in teraction term. It is interesting to note  
the contrast with the main effects: The number of exclusive titles of superior value is 
negatively and significantly rela ted to IPC, while are  positively related to exclus ivity. 
This is in line with ou r theory predicting a strategic tradeoff between maximizing the 
number of complementors that qualify for a minimum quality standard (i.e., IPC) and 
maximizing the quality of com plementors by securing top quality complem entors via 
exclusive  agreements,  after granting them   some  intra-platform  market  power (i.e., 











                                                 
5 This is a well plausible assumption in our case, as we do not see any clear interdependence 
between the average titles’ age of current generation and the number of exclusive titles released for the 





High-Value Exclusive Titles  
Variable 
Model (5-1)  Model (5-2)  Model (5-3)  Model (5-4)  Model (5-5) 
OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS (robust) 
       
Exclusivity  296.54**  421.71**  358.01**  549.45**  549.45** 
  (17.07)  (19.43)  (45.27)  (45.39)  (63.89) 
       
IPC  -179.58**  -145.31**  -340.16**  -263.78**  -263.78** 
  (21.11)  (19.65)  (69.36)  (60.19)  (93.42) 
       
Exclusivity x IPC    -302.41**    -467.40**  -467.40** 
    (27.69)    (57.53)  (129.26) 
       
Platform Price  1.31  -0.78  17.98**  9.08*  9.08 
  (0.89)  (0.84)  (4.23)  (3.79)  (7.28) 
       
Platform Age  1.26**  0.98**  2.24**  1.54**  1.54** 
  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.46) 
       
Platform Age squared  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
       
Generation Competition  -2.23**  -2.79**  -2.21**  -3.23**  -3.23** 
  (0.34)  (0.32)  (0.44)  (0.40)  (0.78) 
       
       
N obs.  648  648  648  648 648 
R-squared  0.97  0.98  0.92  0.94  0.94 
F stat.  1270**  1429**  813**  1001**  287** 
* Significant at the 5%; ** Significant at the 1%. The table reports OLS and 2-Stages Least Squares panel-
data estimations of platform’s number of exclusive titles of high value. All models include time (in quarters) 
and  platform  fixed-effects.  In M odel  5-5 erro rs  are ro bust  to  arbitrary  autocorrelation  and 




Table  5  displays  the e stimation  results  of  models  in which system   quality is the 
dependent variable. As predicted by hypothe sis 1b the coefficient of the interaction 
between  Exclusivity  and  IPC is negative and strongl y  significant in m odel  (5-2). 
However when we instrument the endogenous variables, the same coefficient turns out 
positive  and  not significant in model (5-4).   In fact, besides price, none of the 
instrumented variables are significant. This is a surprising finding. Equally surprising is 
the negative sign of the price variable: This would imply that an increase in platform’s 
price be associated with a lower quality of the system. However, by inspecting the first-
stage estimation results of the IV procedure (available upon request from the authors), 
we  realize that our price instrum ent  in fact   is not significant. W e  believe that this 
problem is not specific to the chosen instrum ent but can be attributed to the restricted 
sample used for testing hypothesis 1b, which, for the generation 5, excludes information 
on  three  out  of  the total f ive  platforms  (3DO, Jaguar   and  Saturn);  precisely  those 
unsuccessful. By using this restricted sample, our identification procedure would fail to 
account for these failure cases; which might ultimately limit and influence accordingly 
our second-stage estimations. We address this issue in the following way. Since in the 
first stage of the IV p rocedure we do not need information about system quality, the 
variable for which we do not have infor mation for failure platforms, we use the whole 
sample (including 3DO, Jaguar and Saturn ) to fit each of our endogenous variables 
(Price,  IPC and Exclu sivity).  We  use then  these  fitted  values and estim ate,  on  the 
restricted sample, the effect of Exclusivity  and IPC on System Quality. We correct the 
standard  errors following Green’s (2003)  widely  accepted  procedure. Results are 
reported in the model (5-5). As H1b predicts,  the coefficient of the interaction term is 
now negative and signif icant. This is in line with findings of the OLS e stimation and 




identification issue highlighted before. Also,  and consistent with our theory, the main 
effect of Exclusivity is positive and significant: an exclusivity strategy focused on the 
promotion,  attraction and selection of s uperior  complementors  can enhance the  
differentiating value and overall quality of the system. System Quality is also negatively 
and significantly related to the IPC variable; a finding that holds in every specification 
of table 5 and is consistent with our theo ry. Platforms that stimulate a wider production 
of complementors via within system competition may well accumulate game titles of 
high quality as well as titles of  inferior quality. However, high levels of IPC reduce  
incentives  of high-quality com plementors,  especially  when  exclusive,  and cons train 






































Model (6-1)  Model (6-2)  Model (6-3)  Model (6-4)  Model (6-5) 
OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS full (robust) 
       
Exclusivity  3.27**  4.66**  4.17**  3.91**  7.11** 
  (0.51)  (0.62)  (0.96)  (1.10)  (1.04) 
       
IPC  -1.38*  -0.92  -2.15  -2.49  -5.28** 
  (0.63)  (0.64)  (1.39)  (1.56)  (1.02) 
       
Exclusivity x IPC    -3.47**    0.90  -4.73* 
    (0.90)    (1.94)  (1.94) 
       
Platform Price  -0.17**  -0.19**  -0.39**  -0.35*  0.01 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (0.19) 
       
Platform Age  -13.42**  -16.9**  -18.52**  -16.22*  -1.80 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
       
Platform Age squared  5.42**  6.69**  6.23*  5.30  0.01 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
       
Generation Competition -0.03**  -0.03**  -0.05**  -0.05**  -0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
       
N obs.  578  578  578  578  578 
R-squared  0.84  0.84  0.25  0.25  0.79 
F stat.  171**  167**  17**  16**  406** 
 + Significant at the 10%; * Significant at the 5%; ** Significant at the 1%. T he table 
reports  OLS  and  2-Stages  Least  Squares  panel-data  estimations  of  platform’s System 
Quality. All models include time (in quarters) and platform fixed-effects. In Model (6-6) 
errors are robust to arbitrary autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The whole sample is 
employed In Model (6-6) to fit endogenous variables in the first-stage and errors have been 
accordingly  adjusted  in the   second-stage  estimation.  Coefficients of  platform age and 
platform age squared have been multiplied by 1k and 100K, respectively, for presentation 
purpose. 
 
Table 6 displays the estim ation results of t hose models with Platform Performance as 
dependent variable. For enhanced levels of  IPC, exclusivity would be detrim ental to 
platform performance. While Exclusivity and IPC af fect positively performance, we 
find  a strong negative effect for their inte raction.  These results  hold  true for every 


























OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  2SLS  2SLS 
(robust)  2SLS  2SLS 
(robust) 
Exclusivity  0.39**    -1.04**  1.37**  1.48**  1.93**  1.93+  1.85*  1.85 
  (0.07)    (0.22)  (0.25)  (0.25)  (0.58)  (1.11)  (0.76)  (1.33) 
                
IPC    0.65**  1.83**  2.58**  2.35**  4.07**  4.07**  4.98**  4.98** 
    (0.09)  (0.26)  (0.24)  (0.23)  (0.60)  (1.09)  (0.68)  (1.25) 
                
Exclusivity x 
IPC        -6.06**  -5.91**  -10.09**  -10.09**  -12.72**  -12.72** 
        (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.96)  (2.07)  (1.31)  (2.37) 
                
Differentiation         -0.67**      -0.50**  -0.50* 
         (0.09)      (0.14)  (0.21) 
                
Differentiation 
squared         0.58**      0.49**  0.49* 
         (0.09)      (0.15)  (0.20) 
                
Platform Price  -0.06**  -0.08**  -0.08**  -0.12**  -0.12**  -0.18**  -0.18*  -0.10  -0.10 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.11) 
                
Platform Age  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.01**  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02**  -0.02** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
                
Platform Age 
squared  0.01  0.12**  0.24**  0.45**  0.40**  0.67**  0.67**  0.60**  0.60+ 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
                
Generation 
Competition  -1.96  0.86  1.08  -4.13  11.33*  -15.82**  -15.82+  -5.84  -5.84 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
                
N obs.  944  944  944  944  895  944  944 895 895 
R-squared  0.76  0.76  0.77  0.81  0.83  0.78  0.78  0.71  0.71 
F stat.  130**  135**  133** 169**  172**  140**  52**  102**  44** 
+ Significant at the 10%; * Significant at the 5%; ** Significant at the 1%. The dependent variable is 
Platform  Market Share.  Models  (7-6) th rough  (7-9)  show  instrumental  variables  estimations;  all 
specificiations include time (in quarters) and platform fixed-effects. Models (7-7) and (7-9) report results 
with  errors  robust  to arb itrary  autocorrelation  and  heteroskedasticity.  In Mod els  (7-8)  and  (7-9) 
observations regarding the NES platform are excluded from the analysis, due to missing values on the 
genre variable. Coefficients of platform age squared and generation competition have been multiplied by 










Hypothesis 2 about the quadratic effect of system differentiation on performance 
is  also sup ported.  As  the f ull  model of   table 6 sho ws,  the co efficient  of  the 
differentiation  variable is significant and  negative,  as expected: departing from the 
mainstream composition of the system ’s portfolio has negative effects on platform’s  
appeal and performance. Yet, the squared te rm is positive and significant: As syste m 
differentiation grows large, ri val platforms have no longer  capability equivalence; the 
differentiated  platform offers com plementor  bundles with superio r  ability to satis fy 
niche’s customer needs.  
Regarding control variables in Table 6  note that platform price has a negative 
effect on platform market share, as expected. However, this effect is not significant for 
the IV models when including also  the differentiation variables in the analysis. Corts 
and  Lederman  (2009) also find platform   price  be insignificant in som e  of t heir 
specifications. The result on the effect of th e number of rivals competing in the s ame 
generation is also of interest.  After controlling for endogeneity, we find  this variable 
influences  negatively perform ance  of the fo cal  platform. However, this effect is 
significant  only in m odels  (6-6)  and  (6-7).  When  we in clude  differentiation in the 
model, this variable is no longer significant. This may be consistent with what shown in 
Corts and Lederman (2009); namely that, the  number of rivals competing in the same  
generation can have a negative but also a positive effect on performance, depending on 
the  presence (or lack thereof) of cross-g eneration  externalities,  which,  in turn, is  
function of the amount of multi-homing versus exclusive complementors. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
In  this study we have taken the pers pective  of treating  complementors  as 
resources  of the platform ’s  system and an alyzed the reasons that explain a tradeoff 




that  pursue a strategy of tying in excl usive  complementors  and at the sam e  time 
maximize  the num ber  of com plementors  get stuck in the m iddle  (using Porter´s  
terminology) and lack strategic focus. This ev entually translates in lower perform ance, 
as evidenced by our findings. W e also report arguments and evidence that show how 
differentiation strategies in terms of the content type provided by com plementors pays 
off only for relatively high levels of syst em differentiation, while, for relatively low 
levels, it is detrimental to performance. This finding further confirms the importance of 
building distinctive capabilities in terms of diverse functional resources when aiming at 
serving  different cus tomer  needs. W e  believe  that our findings  contribute  to the 
integration of the nascent l iterature about platform market strategy with m ainstream 
Resource-Based Theory.  
Our findings are robust to addressing a  wide variety of common econom etric 
problems  since the richness of   our dataset allows for  the  use of sophisticated 
econometric procedures. In particular, we fi nd the same results using standard OLS 
techniques, alternative measures, econometric specifications that take care of potential  
endogeneity  and platform   fixed-effects specif ications  that prevent potential biases 
arising from unobservable platform  characteristics constant across tim e. However, as 
other studies, our work is not free from limitations. The empirical evidence we provide 
in  favor of our hypotheses m ay  be constrai ned  to the specifics of the videogame  
industry.  This  industry  is charact erized  by th e  existence  and im portance  of  strong 
heterogeneity of complementors. A few hits  achieve the bulk of total sales – in our 
sample, top 10% of the titles generate about  53% of total sales, while the lowest 10% 
represent only 0,2% of total  sales. This means that the  issue of attracting top quality 
complementors is critical for the success of videogame platforms and therefore, in this 




competition may be more important and severe than in other industries in which the ex-
ante  quality  of  complementors  may  be  more  homogeneous.  Although  multi-sided 
platforms operating in other sectors face similar issues, it rests on fu ture research to 
show whether and to w hich extent our findi ngs, and the consequent  implications for 
platform strategists, are applicable to these sectors.  
Another  critical characteristic of the  videogame  industry that m ay  drive  our 
results is the strong competition present in  all generations. For platforms operating in 
less competitive environments (e.g., Windows in the PC operating system; Google), the 
trade-offs in complementors strategies might be less apparent or non-existent. In the  
case  of W indows  or Google, these dynam ics  are com plicated  by the concom itant 
presence  of direct and indirect network ex ternalities,  so that,   for th ese  platforms, 
amassing a larger installed base of customers faster than rivals through a wide offer of 
complementors  may  be  more  important  than  focusing on com plementors’  quality. 
Eventually, once a platform becomes the dominant standard, IPC and exclusivity may 
also  provide com plementary  value. Quas i-monopoly  platforms,  by leveraging on its 
high bargaining power, may push for a high number of complementors in an exclusive 
regime  without detrim ental  effects on platfo rm  performance.  Future research might 
expand our work to these cases and enrich our knowledge by teasing out the effects of 
direct versus indirect network externalities.  Future research should also inspect deeper 
the size versus quality network effect. Our st udy shows that this is a relevant issue; 
however, we do not directly inspect which of  the two effects is dom inant. It might be 
that  quality  of the system has an im pact  on performance  only after the system   has 
gained  popularity;  that is, size -variety  of  platform’s  complementor  portfolio m ight 




phase of the market, the quality of the system would be the real differentiation factor for 
performance progressions.   
Finally, in this work we have abstracted  from governance-related strategies that 
platforms may undertake to alleviate the strategic trade-offs. Multi-sided platforms may 
resort to complex organizational arrangem ents that may overcome the lack of strateg ic 
focus and the hold-up problem  that high-quality complementors experience under an 
exclusivity agreement. In other set-ups, different intra-organizational arrangements have 
been  suggested to alleviate strategic tr ade-offs  present when companies pursue 
conflicting strategic goals. Ma rkides  (2008) for  instance, argues in favor of distinct 
organizational  designs when com panies  compete  with d ual  business  models.  The 
designs he proposes are conti ngent on both the nature of the conflict between business  
models and its strategic similarity. Future research should address which organizational 
designs can be used to alleviate the strategic trade-offs we have identified in this paper. 
Along these lines platform  governance can be  a particular and powerful leverage to 
attract  high quality complem entors.  While  platforms  in diverse sectors engage in 
different  strategic allian ces  and agreem ents  with providers of com plementors,  other 
platforms such as, for instance, Sun Micr osystems, Linux, or Google are following the 
diverse approach of opening their system, or part of it, so that complementors’ providers 
can freely contribute to the integration and evolution of the system. Some studies have 
started analyzing, for instance, when to open a platform  (Economides & Katsamakas, 
2005;  Eisenmann,  2008) or where the com petitive  advantage  comes  from for open 
platforms (Garud & K umaraswamy, 1993). Yet,  we still know very  little about how 
these  different platform governance arrangem ents  affect the strategies em ployed  to 




Managing  the com plementors’  side of th e  market  is a n  important  lever  for 
platforms to influence the external environment and the final market outcome. Although 
complex, this process is direct function of strategic maneuvering by platform providers; 
platform  success is ultim ately  the result of   these stra tegic  interactions.  Despite  the 
increasing attention and effort toward the studying of competitive dynamics in platform-
mediated  markets  in  the  emerging  related  literature,  we still lack   a  comprehensive 
knowledge about the interdepe ndence among the different strategies platform s use to 
shape the competitive landscape in their favor and the contingencies upon which such 
strategies  assume  complementary  or unpa ired  value-creation  capacity.  This study 
provides a theoretical and deta iled empirical analysis that  unravels these dynamics in 
the  U.S. videogame  industry. However, it re presents  only a first step for a broader 
understanding of the phenomena at issue, which calls on future studies to advance our 
knowledge  of platfor m-mediated  markets  by  exploring other contingencies and 
industries, and help developing a more com plete contingency approach to the strategic 
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